Isi wikileaks ini sangat penting, karena membongkar kebusukan pilkada 2007. Sekaligus juga membuat hal2 yg sepele spt poster Foke dimana2, ada disini dan menjadi masuk akal.
Penting sekali warga Jakarta untuk tahu isinya.

Apakah anda bisa menerima kenyataan bahwa Jakarta diperlakukan seperti mesin ATM bagi segelintir orang?




E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017


JAKARTA 00001157 001.2 OF 004

Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reasons: 1.4 (b) and


¶1. (C) On August 8, Jakarta will host the first directly
contested governor’s election in the 500-year history of the
city. The election represents arguably the most significant
political event in the country between now and the 2009
Presidential elections, and the results will have
implications for the major parties and potential candidates
in 2009. Sitting Vice Governor Fauzi Bowo has enlisted the
support of 17 political parties in his bid for the
governorship and clearly established himself as a prohibitive
favorite. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the largest
party in the city with just under 25 percent of the local
legislative seats, nominated former Deputy Police Chief Adang
Daradjatun as its candidate (Ref B). As with all elections
in Indonesia, money politics have played a major role in
shaping the playing field for the governorship. Our contacts
tell us that Vice Governor Fauzi purchased the support of
three of the four largest political parties in Jakarta for at
least five billion Indonesian rupiah apiece ($555,000).
Adang reportedly paid PKS between 15 and 25 billion rupiah
($1,666,666 – $2,750,000) for its support. Fauzi and Adang’s
deep pockets, coupled with the sheer enormity of Fauzi Bowo’s
coalition, have effectively frozen out potential opposition
and turned the election into a two man show: Adang and PKS
versus Fauzi and everyone else.

——————————————— ——–

¶2. (C) Vice Governor Fauzi Bowo moved aggressively to
establish himself as the overwhelming favorite in the
Governor’s race. As reported in Ref B, Fauzi has
masterfully, if not always ethically, taken full advantage of
the trappings of incumbency to increase his name recognition.
The Vice Governor spearheaded an anti-drug campaign that
conveniently involved the use of his likeness on several
thousand posters placed strategically all over the city. He
emerged from Governor Sutiyoso’s shadows over the course of
the last year to become a frequent spokesperson for
government policy, and spends a good deal of his time
traveling throughout the city participating in events that
one could be excused for confusing with campaign rallies.
Perhaps most importantly, he has effectively distanced
himself from the disastrous flooding that killed dozens of
Jakartans and left thousands homeless earlier this year.

¶3. (C) As successful as Fauzi has been in boosting his name
recognition through his non-official campaign, the real
difference maker at this early stage has been Fauzi’s ability
to influence the election the old fashioned way: with cash.
Dadan Irawan, a member of the Golkar party central board,
told us that Vice Governor Fauzi paid off the three largest
parties in the Jakarta local legislature after PKS (the
Democratic Party with 20 percent, the Indonesian Democratic
Party – Struggle (PDI-P) with 13.5 percent, and Golkar with 8
percent) to endorse his candidacy and crowd out opposition.
Dadan said the Vice Governor gave them each a minimum of five
billion rupiah for their support, and then secured the
backing of another 13 smaller parties for varying amounts.
Fauzi’s alliance also now includes the United Development
Party (PPP), with 7.5 percent; the Prosperous Peace Party
(PDS), with 5.7 percent; and the Reform Star Party (PBR),
with 3 percent. If Fauzi’s coalition stays together and
every party that has announced support for his candidacy
formally registers with him on June 5, he will have the
support of 63.1 percent of the seats represented in the
Jakarta legislature

¶4. (C) Dadan told us that Fauzi’s primary financier in the
massive party buyout effort has been sitting Governor
Sutiyoso. According to Dadan and other contacts, Sutiyoso
eagerly bankrolled Fauzi’s candidacy with the full
expectation that Fauzi would reward this loyalty by blocking
any efforts to investigate Sutiyoso’s murky business dealings
after he departs office. Fauzi will be expected not only to
protect Sutiyoso from messy corruption charges, but also to

JAKARTA 00001157 002.2 OF 004

allow him to continue the money making opportunities he has
enjoyed while Governor.

¶5. (C) According to Dadan, money was not the only weapon that
Fauzi used to assemble his prodigious coalition. Reprising
their successful cooperation in the Banten gubernatorial
election (Ref A), Golkar and PDI-P opted to join forces in a
conscious effort to defeat PKS. Dadan told us that Golkar
still very much viewed PKS as a threat and believed that it
was essential to defeat PKS resoundingly in the governor’s
race. A PKS victory would give the party a springboard to
bigger and better things, and Golkar’s leadership felt it was
imperative to band together with as many parties as possible
to defeat the common threat.


¶6. (C) When the Charge d’Affaires recently met with Vice
Governor Fauzi and asked about the campaign, Fauzi replied
somewhat disingenuously that he faced an “uphill struggle.”
Fauzi said that his current responsibilities as Vice Governor
prevented him from campaigning or advertising and argued that
this would handicap him relative to the opposition. Fauzi
noted that shortly after the floods devastated Jakarta
earlier this year, many political pundits commented that his
political future had “washed away with the flood water.” He
pointed out that while that speculation was obviously
premature, the flooding issue would loom large and he would
have to find a way to articulate how he would battle the
problem as Governor.

¶7. (C) After the Charge noted Fauzi’s broad political
support, the Vice Governor downplayed the importance of party
endorsements and stressed that individual voters would select
a candidate based on his or her merits, not their party
affiliation. The Vice Governor told the Charge that he had
not yet selected his running mate, but implied that it would
most likely be someone with a military background (Note: the
media have widely reported that former generals are the top
two candidates for the job: Mokodongan and Kirbianto. End
Note). According to Fauzi, the Jakarta governor’s race was
extremely significant and would serve as a “barometer” for
the 2009 Presidential race.


¶8. (C) As reported in Ref B, PKS announced last year that
Adang Daradjatun would run as the PKS candidate for governor.
PKS recently announced that Dani Anwar, a local Jakarta
legislator, would run as his deputy. From the start, the
choice of Adang was a curious one for a party allegedly
committed to clean governance, social justice, and the purity
of the Islamic struggle. After all, Adang had developed a
reputation as the “wealthiest police officer in Indonesia,”
and no one seemed to believe this was because of his wife’s
inheritance. Beyond the rampant allegations of corruption,
his position within the law enforcement establishment seemed
like a poor fit for PKS. The most surprising aspect of the
pick, however, was the fact that he had very little name
recognition. PKS held the most seats in the Jakarta
legislature and had an opportunity to capture the most
important governorship in the country. Not only that, but
winning in Jakarta would give the party a signature victory
and generate momentum, not to mention provide a showcase to
demonstrate the party’s capacity to govern. So, everybody
wanted to know, why would PKS nominate an anonymous corrupt
cop as the PKS standard bearer for its biggest election test

¶9. (C) The primary reason PKS selected Adang, it turned out,
was pretty straightforward: money. According to PKS
legislator Zulkieflimansyah (Zul), Adang simply outbid
everybody else and secured the party’s support for 15 billion
rupiah (Note: several of our other contacts told us Adang
paid 25 billion. End Note). Though Zul admitted to a heated
internal party debate about whether to sell out to the
highest bidder, ultimately PKS determined the party needed
the money. Zul told us that another key factor that came
into play was the shortage of qualified PKS cadres.
According to Zul, the party lacked individuals with the right
combination of name recognition and governing skills to fit
the bill. Nominating someone like MPR Chairman Hidayat Nur

JAKARTA 00001157 003.2 OF 004

Wahid with the star power to win, but without the capacity to
govern effectively, would be a disaster for the party.
Winning the election would be the easy part he said; PKS did
not have anyone who could run the city effectively.

¶10. (C) In the Charge d’Affaire’s April 18 meeting with PKS
Chairman Tifatul Sembiring and Zulkieflimansyah, the two PKS
leaders admitted that the party had committed to Adang
because of his wealth. Tifatul said that PKS had very little
money and needed to boost its finances. According to
Tifatul, Adang’s strong police connections would also be
extremely useful to the party in local elections throughout
the country. The party’s relations had always been rocky
with the police, Tifatul said, but Adang had changed that
virtually overnight. Zul told the Charge that the choice of
Adang also had the added benefit of inoculating the party
against charges of radicalism. How radical a party could PKS
be if it was willing to nominate a policeman for governor,
Zul asked rhetorically?

¶11. (C) On April 20, we attended the PKS anniversary
celebration and asked PKS legislator Abdul Hakim for his
thoughts on the election. According to Abdul, PKS could not
win the Jakarta governorship “alone” and had virtually no
chance at victory; expectations were low. Fauzi Bowo would
win handily he said, but this would actually be a good for
the party, as no one within its leadership actually believed
PKS was ready to assume the burden of leading the city
anyway. It would be, he added, the ideal outcome. PKS would
take Adang’s money and lose, but without damaging its image.


¶12. (C) As it now stands, Fauzi Bowo and Adang Daradjatun
collectively enjoy the support of 86.6 percent of the seats
represented in the Jakarta legislature. Candidates must
enlist the backing of parties, or coalitions of parties, with
at least 15 percent in order to qualify for the race. If
Fauzi Bowo’s coalition stays intact until the official June 5
registration deadline, no other potential candidates would be
able to muster the minimum requisite support.

¶13. (C) There is only one other candidate with the slightest
hope of securing the 15 percent needed to register. Sarwono
Kusumaatmadja, a member of the Regional Representatives
Council (DPD) and a former environment minister is the one
candidate who has evinced any interest in actually debating
issues of importance. A former Golkar Secretary-General, he
was the first minister to demand Suharto’s resignation in
1998 and would bring legitimate reformist credentials to a
potential candidacy. He established an impressive internet
site to promote his ideas on everything from combating bird
flu to women’s rights (, and would
undoubtedly inject a much needed note of seriousness into the

¶14. (C) In recent weeks, both the National Mandate Party
(PAN) and National Awakening Party (PKB), the fifth and
eighth largest parties in Jakarta respectively, have lined up
behind his candidacy. At least five other very small parties
have also allegedly pledged their support to Sarwono, yet he
can still only claim 12.6 of the seats in the Jakarta
legislature. Complicating matters for Sarwono, the PAN/PKB
alliance that forms the backbone of his current coalition is
uneasy at best. The two parties have sparred publicly about
the second half of the Sarwono ticket and it is unclear if
there is any prospect for a compromise pick for Vice Governor
that would satisfy both. Regardless, even with the support
of PAN, PKB, and all the remaining small, unattached parties,
Sarwono needs a significant defection from the Fauzi Bowo
camp in order to run. By all accounts, such a defection is
unlikely, and the odds are that Sarwono will be forced to
watch the election from the sidelines.


¶15. (C) A recent Indonesian poll conducted by the Indonesian
Survey Institute (LSI) appeared to support the general
impression that the election will be Fauzi Bowo’s to lose.
According to LSI, 34 percent of respondents pointed to Fauzi
Bowo as their top choice for governor, while retired general
Agum Gumelar came in second with 20 percent, despite the fact

JAKARTA 00001157 004.2 OF 004

that he does not have a political vehicle to run. Adang came
in third with 19 percent, while Sarwono rounded out the poll
with 10 percent.


¶16. (C) Conventional wisdom suggests that the Jakarta
governor’s race will, in some fashion, serve as a litmus test
for the 2009 presidential election. While this may be
overstating the case (the distribution of party support in
Jakarta is significantly different from the national
electoral map), its national significance far surpasses all
other local elections and it will generate national

¶17. (C) No one will be watching the governor’s race more
closely than Governor Sutiyoso. He has clear designs on
higher office, and his aspirations are directly connected to
Fauzi Bowo’s fate. If Fauzi wins, Sutiyoso will be able to
continue to treat Jakarta like an ATM machine and generate
the type of money that he will need to launch a serious
presidential candidacy. In the unlikely event that Fauzi
loses, Sutiyoso’s reputation will take a serious blow, as
many people view Fauzi’s candidacy as a referendum on
Sutiyoso’s 10-year reign as governor. Even more
significantly, without an ally in the governor’s mansion,
most people believe Sutiyoso would be vulnerable to any
number of criminal investigations.

¶18. (C) Roy Janis, one of the founders of the Democratic
Renewal Party (PDP) told us that Sutiyoso had already
approached PDP about supporting his 2009 presidential
campaign. Our contacts from other parties tell us Sutiyoso
has made similar overtures across the political party
spectrum. The Jakarta governor’s race will go a long way
towards determining whether or not his candidacy will be


¶19. (C) The rationale PKS used to select Adang Daradjatun as
its candidate for governor reflects a pragmatism that would
not seem at all out of place in a Golkar Central Board
meeting. Party leaders essentially threw in the towel a year
ago and decided to use the race to generate resources for the
future. The logic makes sense, in the Indonesian political
context, but is yet another indication that PKS is becoming
like all the other parties it once worked so hard to
differentiate itself from.

¶20. (C) In many ways the Jakarta governor’s race has shown
the soft underbelly of democracy “Indonesian style.” Voters
hungry for a serious campaign about the myriad problems
afflicting a city still reeling from devastating flooding,
will have to content themselves with “a campaign” between two
candidates who bought their way into contention and squeezed
out all competition. Despite the intense press coverage of
the election and its national importance, the Jakarta elites
have rigged the game. What should have been an interesting
debate about the future of the city, will instead amount to
little more than a coronation for the status quo. Analysts
expect turnout to be very low, and it is not difficult to
understand why.